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(4) Jurisdiction
2. Jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2(a)-3
(2)(j), which states "(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: .... (j) cases transferred to the Court of
Appeals from the Supreme Court."

(5) Issues for Review with citation to standard of review and preservation of the
issue in the record.
5.1 Did the court improperly convert a motion under Rule 12(b) to a Rule 56
motion without notice and an ability to gather evidence?
The standard of review for this issue is quoted in Tuttle vs. Olds, 2007 UT App
10, att6and^8:
\6 Plaintiffs claim that the trial court's reference to the
motion as one for judgment on the pleadings, as well as its
failures to exclude matters outside the pleadings and to properly
convert the motion into one for summary judgment, warrant
reversal. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)-(c). "If a court does not
exclude material outside the pleadings and fails to convert a
rale 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment, it is
reversible error unless the dismissal can be justified without
considering the outside documents." Oakwood Vill., L.L.C. v.
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT I0l,1fl2, 104 P.3d 1226. The propriety
of a dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is a question of law we review
for correctness. See Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co.,
910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are
appropriate only where the court concludes that the plaintiff has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, after
accepting all the factual allegations made in the complaint as
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. See id.
f 8 Plaintiffs claim that, in dismissing the case, the trial
court improperly considered material outside the pleadings. If a
court considers material outside the pleadings in deciding a rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must convert the motion
into one for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This
rule 12(b) conversion process includes giving the parties
reasonable notice and opportunity to submit all pertinent summary
judgment materials for the court's consideration. See id.;
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 1996);
Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah , 561 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1977). The notice and opportunity to submit requirements
are especially important with respect to the party against whom
5

judgment is entered. See Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 (stating that
the opportunity for the non-moving party to submit rule 56
material is particularly important). Our rules provide that
complaints and answers constitute pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P.
7(a) (including replies to counterclaims and answers to crossclaims,
as well as third-party complaints and answers, within the
definition of pleadings). A matter outside the pleadings
"include[s] any written or oral evidence . . . which . . .
substantiates] . . . and does not merely reiterate what is said
in the pleadings." Oakwood Vill., 2004 UT 101 at ^12 (second,
third, and fourth alterations in original) (quotations and
citation omitted).
This issue was preserved by way of objection and motion to continue the hearing
to get the subpoena results from a relevant witness, see transcript p 16 lines 13 to
page 17 line 15 and also page 18 line 17 to page 19 line 8.
5.2 Did the court enter a Judgment on the pleadings when the pleadings when the
pleadings were not closed and now answer was filed?
The standard of review for this issue is quoted in Tuttle vs. Olds, 2007 UT App
10, at Tf6(quoted in full above) and ^|7:
Tf7 Plaintiffs claim that the trial court should be reversed for
treating Defendants' rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a rule
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P.
12(c). In its order granting the motion, the trial court
referred to the motion as one for a judgment on the pleadings,
despite a reminder from Defendants that their motion was one to
dismiss under 12(b)(6). Because Defendants never filed an answer
to the complaint, the pleadings were not closed at the time the
trial court granted the so-called judgment on the pleadings. A
motion for a judgment on the pleadings cannot be made, let alone
granted, prior to the closing of the pleadings. See id. (stating
that 12(c) motions are to be made after the pleadings have been
closed). We will therefore review the trial court's decision as
if it had correctly referred to the granted motion as one for
dismissal under rule 12(b)(6).!
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This issue was not preserved, as the court raised this issue for the first time
when it docketed it's Judgment as "05-29-07 Filed judgment: Judgment on
Pleading" As there was no opportunity to respond to an answer, or even advanced
notice that the judgment was "on the pleading" this issue should be reviewed at the
appellate level.
5.3 Did the Court allow an affirmative defense of "proper purpose" and resjudicata to be raised in defense of the abuse of process claim on Rule 12(b)(6)
motion ?
The standard of review is found in Tucker V. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. 2002 UT 54 further quoting Gill v. Timm, which notes that
"affirmative defenses must be set forth in responsive pleadings and are usually
waived if not so pleaded." (citations omitted). 720 P.2d 1352, 1353-54 (Utah
1986):
7 Gill recites the general rule that affirmative defenses should be set
forth in responsive pleadings. Id.; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c).
Because dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is "justified only when the
allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate that the
plaintiff does not have a claim," 5 A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 345 (2d ed.
1990) (emphasis added),(2) this general rule recognizes that
affirmative defenses, which often raise issues outside of the
complaint, are not generally appropriately raised in a motion to
dismiss under rule 12(b)(6).
This issue was preserved for appeal at page 472 of the record, at ^[6 in Petitioner's
Rule 52 and 59 motion and at trial page 57 line 25 through page 58 line 14.
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5.4 Should dismiss have been without prejudice based upon the pleadings?
The standard of review is quoted above in Turtle vs. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, at ^6.
In a dismissal based upon Rule 12(b), which has not been converted on full and
fair notice to a Rule 56 motion, the dismissal should be without prejudice to other
claims, causes of action, or pleadings being raised by motion for leave to amend.
This issue was preserved at trial at Transcript page 46 lines 6-11.
5.5 Was an award of attorney's fees appropriate given the court must make factual
inferences in favor of Plaintiff, not Defendant.
The standard of review is found in To quote Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT APP 36,
996 P.2d 1081 which states:
When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), an
appellate court must accept the material allegations of the complaint
as true, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it
clearly appears the complainant can prove no set of facts in support
of his or her claims. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841
P.2d 742, 744 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992). "A dismissal is a severe measure and should be
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of
its claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah
1990). Additionally, we "must consider all the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff."
Anderson, 841 P.2d at 744. "The propriety of a trial court's decision
to grant or deny a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) is a question
of law that we review for correctness." Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1253.
This issue was preserved on page 472 of the record, f 7 in the Rule 52 and 59
motion ruled upon by the Court and at trial in transcript as argued in section 9.4.
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5.5 Was Summary Judgment against Plaintiff under Rule 56 appropriate?
The standard of review for the granting of the motion to dismiss in this
case is given by Ellsworth v. Lowell 2006 UT 77 ^fl 1-12:
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Tfl 1 While Lowell moved to dismiss Mr. Ellsworth's complaint
pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
when "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." Utah
R. Civ. P. 12(b) (2006). Because "affidavits or other evidence"
were presented to, and not excluded by, the district court, we
review that court's decision as a summary judgment. DOIT, Inc.
v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 839 (Utah 1996).
If 12 "[A] challenge to a summary judgment presents for
review only conclusions of law because, by definition, cases
decided on summary judgment do not resolve factual disputes."
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991).
We review the district court's legal conclusions for correctness,
without according deference to the district court. Id.
In addition, the standard of review for motions to dismiss under Rule 56
requires that the facts be recited by the appellate court in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. See Johnson v. Hermes 2005 UT 82 at ^[2:
%1 When reviewing a rule 56(c) motion for summary
judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. See Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake
County, 2003 UT 28, f 4, 73 P.3d 362. Thus, in reviewing these
facts, we present them in a light most favorable to Appellant
Hermes, the commercial developer in this case.
This issue was preserved for appeal at transcript page 16 line 13-22, and page 472
of the record, \l in the Rule 52 and 59 motion.
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5.6 Can Utah's garnishment law allow garnishment of retirement assets under 29
U.S.C. 1144(a), for any purpose whatsoever?
The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201,
1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999);
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial
code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518,
521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
A question of legislative intent associated with statutory interpretation is a matter
of law, not of fact. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law. See Slisze
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d
276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting which statute governs defendant's
placement is question of law reviewed for correctness).
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1041, R. 1411-1414, and transcript page
23.
5.7 Should the court void and preempt Utah Law under federal law.
The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201,
1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999);
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial
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code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518,
521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
A question of legislative intent associated with statutory interpretation is a matter
of law, not of fact. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law. See Slisze
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d
276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting which statute governs defendant's
placement is question of law reviewed for correctness).
This issue was preserved for appeal atR. 1411-1414. Even if not preserved, a
determination by a Utah Court that state garnishment law may attach ERISA
exempt retirement accounts will lead to the preemption of the entire law by a
federal court.
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(6)Citations to determinative law.
§78-2(a)-3 (2)0)
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court.
29U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1),
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated.
29U.S.C. 1144(a)
(a) Supersedure; effective date Except as provided in subsection (b)
of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III
of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described
in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b)
of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168
"The issue of whether The issue of "whether res judicata bars an
action presents a question of law[,] which we review for
correctness." Massey v. Board of Trs. of the Ogden Area Cmty.
Action Comm., Inc., 2004 UT App 27,15, 86 P.3d 120 (alteration in
original) (quotations and citation omitted)."
Johnson v. Hermes 2005 UT 82
12 When reviewing a rule 56(c) motion for summary
judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. See Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake
County, 2003 UT 28,14, 73 P.3d 362. Thus, in reviewing these
facts, we present them in a light most favorable to Appellant
Hermes, the commercial developer in this case.
Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT APP 36
When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), an
appellate court must accept the material allegations of the complaint
as true, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it
clearly appears the complainant can prove no set of facts in support
of his or her claims. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841
P.2d 742, 744 (Utah
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Ct. App. 1992). "A dismissal is a severe measure and should be
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of
its claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah
1990). Additionally, we "must consider all the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff."
Anderson, 841 P.2d at 744. "The propriety of a trial court's decision
to grant or deny a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) is a question
of law that we review for correctness." Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1253.
Rule 12(b) and (c)
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if
one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option
of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper
venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is
permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with
one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or
motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or
objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that
claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6)
to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are
closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may
move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
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Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary
judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or
any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this
rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the
motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material
facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts
are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal

knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of
all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party
failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions
to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as
is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented
pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting
them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable
attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged
guilty of contempt.
Turtle vs. Olds, 2007 UT App 10
f 6 Plaintiffs claim that the trial court's reference to the
motion as one for judgment on the pleadings, as well as its
failures to exclude matters outside the pleadings and to properly
convert the motion into one for summary judgment, warrant
reversal. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)-(c). "If a court does not
exclude material outside the pleadings and fails to convert a
rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment, it is
reversible error unless the dismissal can be justified without
considering the outside documents." Oakwood Vill., L.L.C. v.
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,1J12, 104 P.3d 1226. The propriety
of a dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is a question of law we review
for correctness. See Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co.,
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910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are
appropriate only where the court concludes that the plaintiff has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, after
accepting all the factual allegations made in the complaint as
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. See id.
\1 Plaintiffs claim that the trial court should be reversed for
treating Defendants' rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a rule
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P.
12(c). In its order granting the motion, the trial court
referred to the motion as one for a judgment on the pleadings,
despite a reminder from Defendants that their motion was one to
dismiss under 12(b)(6). Because Defendants never filed an answer
to the complaint, the pleadings were not closed at the time the
trial court granted the so-called judgment on the pleadings. A
motion for a judgment on the pleadings cannot be made, let alone
granted, prior to the closing of the pleadings. See id. (stating
that 12(c) motions are to be made after the pleadings have been
closed). We will therefore review the trial court's decision as
if it had correctly referred to the granted motion as one for
dismissal under rule 12(b)(6). 1
Tf8 Plaintiffs claim that, in dismissing the case, the trial
court improperly considered material outside the pleadings. If a
court considers material outside the pleadings in deciding a rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must convert the motion
into one for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This
rule 12(b) conversion process includes giving the parties
reasonable notice and opportunity to submit all pertinent summary
judgment materials for the court's consideration. See id.;
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 1996);
Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah , 561 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1977). The notice and opportunity to submit requirements
are especially important with respect to the party against whom
judgment is entered. See Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 (stating that
the opportunity for the non-moving party to submit rule 56
material is particularly important). Our rules provide that
complaints and answers constitute pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P.
7(a) (including replies to counterclaims and answers to crossclaims,
as well as third-party complaints and answers, within the
definition of pleadings). A matter outside the pleadings
"include[s] any written or oral evidence . . . which . . .
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substantiates]... and does not merely reiterate what is said
in the pleadings.1' Oakwood VilL, 2004 UT 101 at 1J12 (second,
third, and fourth alterations in original) (quotations and
citation omitted).
UCA 78-23-13
78-23-13. Injunctive relief, damages, or both allowed against
creditor to prevent violation of chapter ~ Costs and attorney's fees.
An individual or the spouse or a dependent of the individual is
entitled to injunctive relief, damages, or both, against a creditor or
other person to prevent or redress a violation of this chapter. A court
may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a party entitled to
injunctive relief or damages.
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(7) Statement of the Case,
1) Defendant and Appeallee issued a writ of garnishment against retirement
accounts which are exempt from attachment under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1),
and execution against properly known to belong to Plaintiffs employer,
and exempt and largely worthless property such as living room and kitchen
furniture on December 1, 2007 for the purposes of harassment of Petitioner
in case # 050922650. See Record at 1-7, complaint.
2) In response to this violation of UCA 78-23-13 and abuse of process,
Plaintiff filed the case this appeal is taken from in the West Jordan District,
where Petitioner resides and the harm was done. No relief was granted by
the court prior to the filing of this case.
3) The complaint alleged harm due to encumbrance of his employers property,
lost time, and attorneys fees allowed under UCA 78-23-13.
4) Defendant's filed a motion under Rule 12(b) to dismiss and attached
affidavits from attorneys, but no other fact witnesses, in support of their
claim. No affidavits from actual fact witnesses who were not attorneys
were attached. See Record at 9-13 8.
5) Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition, and concurrently a motion for
summary disposition under Rule 56, as he understood that if they could ask
the court to proceed under Rule 56 he could also. See Record at 290-311.
This was supported by affidavits from multiple individuals covering all
aspects of the claims. See Record at 169-290.
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6) Defendants did not reply to the memorandum in opposition to dismissal,
but did respond to the motion for summary disposition with a motion to
strike evidence as well as a response. See Record pages 290-322.
7) The court held a hearing on February 2nd 2007, at which it heard argument
from both parties. Plaintiff argued that evidence was not available for the
hearing, and that a delay under Rule 56 should be granted by the court. See
minute entry at Record page 468-469.
8) The court allowed an order from another case to be filed, without notice, at
hearing in order to allegedly prove that another court had resolved the
issues before it. Petitioner was not allowed time to respond. See transcript
at page 61 line 1-3.
9) The court, only at the end of the hearing, announced that it would treat the
Rule 12(b) motion as one under Rule 56. It did not allow additional time to
gather evidence as requested.
10)The court announced that the complaint had not been filed in good faith,
and only for the purposes of harassment, thereby awarding attorneys fees of
any amount sought by Defendants. See Transcript pages 61-66.
1 l)An order was prepared by defendants, while a rule 52 and 59 motion was
prepared by Plaintiff. Plaintiff objected to the order.
12) After disregarding a rule 52 and 59 motion summarily, the court entered a
the findings of fact and order without change. See Record at 582-595
Plaintiff appealed for the first time. See Record at 515-516.
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13)The court then entered a "Judgment on pleading" after appeal. See Record
at 607-608.
14)Plaintiff appealed again. See Record at 598-600. Plaintiff also amended
his earlier appeal. See Record at 596-597.
15)The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases. See Record at 612-613.
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(8) Summary of arguments:
8.1 Summary of Argument that the court failed to give notice of it's conversion of
the motion from Rule 12(b) to rule 56:
The first mention of the fact that the court would consider items outside the
pleadings was made on transcript page 61, when it accepted the docket of the case
before Judge "Kuntz" (actually Tommey, the transcript has an error) into the
record. The ruling was clearly considering items outside of the pleadings,
however no explicit order converting the Rule 12(b) motion was entered prior to
the order found at Record index 586, in the preamble. An announcement after the
fact is clearly not timely, and should be enough to warrant reversal unless the
court can dismiss on some other grounds such as failure to state a claim. As
argued in other section, the claim was stated properly or near properly, and
Plaintiff should have been allowed to amend his claim if it was defective in form
including by minor interlineations if the words "intentional" needed to be added.
8.2 Summary of argument that the court entered a Judgment on the pleadings
when the pleadings when the pleadings were not closed and no answer was filed.
There is not a dispute that Defendants did not file an answer, and thus did not raise
any affirmative defenses. Despite this, the Court entered "05-29-07 Filed
judgment: Judgment on Pleading" again without notice that the motion was being
converted from rule 12(b) to rule 12(c). This clear error warrants disregarding
any assertions by the court that the Defendants has "pled" anything, they did not
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have a pleading before the court. For those reasons parts of the order of the court
which require a pleading to have been entered should be stricken.
8.3 Summary of the argument that the Court allowed an affirmative defense of
"proper purpose" and res-judicata to be raised in defense of the abuse of process
claim on Rule 12(b)(6):
The Court accepted a new piece of evidence at hearing, a court order which was
not made part of the official record, which purported to prove that the issues in this
case were decided before another court. Petitioner objected that he was denied
due process in preparing a response to the defense raised for the first time at
hearing by Plaintiff, however the Court relied on the fact that relief should have
been sought in another court as one of the primary findings of lack of merit in the
present complain. Also, Defendants were allowed to argue an affirmative defense,
that is issuing process for a proper, rather than improper purpose, although with
mal intent, without raising the affirmative defense for the first time in a responsive
pleading. Based upon this improper action the Judgment should be reversed.
8.4 Summary that dismissal should have been without prejudice to amendment
based upon the pleadings.
As the court ruled without pleadings being closed and answer, upon defect in the
claim, it lacked the ability to reach a conclusion on the merits of the case, thus the
dismissal should be without prejudice.
Furthermore additional evidence, that the attorneys who issued the garnishment
knew that they were going after exempt property prior to issuing the writs, was
discovered between filing of the complaint and the hearing. For this reason
amendment of the claim should have been allowed.
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8.5 Summary of argument on the award of attorney's fees appropriate given the
court must make factual inferences in favor of Plaintiff.
The standard of law is clear. In a motion to dismiss, the court must make all
factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Yet the Court took the proffer
of an opposing attorney as to the mental state of Plaintiff (anger) and ignored the
factual statements by Plaintiff that he was only trying to protect his exempt
retirement accounts, property of third parties, and his own exempt property which
was worthless to Defendants and sought only for the purposes of harassment, such
as living room and kitchen furniture.
8.6 Summary of Can Utah's garnishment law allow garnishment of retirement
assets under 29 U.S.C. 1144(a), for any purpose whatsoever?
The cited federal law always wins against state law. If it is a "proper purpose" to
garnish a retirement account in Utah, then the answer is yes. While the court does
not need to address this issue, a lower court has. Absent overruling the lower
court, the law in Utah is clear.
8.7 Summary of Should the court void and preempt Utah Law under federal law.
Only if Utah does not allow debtors who have their retirement funds garnished to
defend themselves in court and seek damages for doing so, by ruling that an
attorney who knowingly sought to garnish them for malicious reasons was acting
for a "proper purpose in Utah" Federal courts have jurisdiction to overrule the
decision of any Utah court including this one. Pretend I am bringing the issue for

the first time here. The exemption code could be interpreted by the court to
prohibit the preemption of Utah law, however it is the duty of the court of appeals
and not me to construe the law in such a way that federal courts don't invalidate it.
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(9) Argument.
9.1 Did the court improperly convert a motion under Rule 12(b) to a Rule 56
motion without notice and an ability to gather evidence by all sides?
The record on this issue is clear. Nowhere prior to hearing or in any notice of
hearing did the court indicate that it was going to covert the motion from one
under Rule 12(b) to rule 56. At hearing the court considered material outside the
pleadings, and even allowed the Defendants to enter new material outside the
pleading which was only disclosed that day. See Transcript at page 61 lines 1-3.
If a court considers material outside the pleadings in deciding a rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the court must convert the motion into one for summary
judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This rule 12(b) conversion process includes
giving the parties reasonable notice and opportunity to submit all pertinent
summary judgment materials for the court's consideration. See id.; Hebertson v.
Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 1996); Strand v. Associated
Students of Univ. of Utah , 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977). The notice and
opportunity to submit requirements are especially important with respect to the
party against whom judgment is entered. See Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 (stating that
the opportunity for the non-moving party to submit rule 56 material is particularly
important). Our rules provide that complaints and answers constitute pleadings.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) (including replies to counterclaims and answers to
crossclaims, as well as third-party complaints and answers, within the definition of
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pleadings). A matter outside the pleadings ffinclude[s] any written or oral evidence
. . . which .. .substantiates] . . . and does not merely reiterate what is said in the
pleadings." Oakwood VilL, 2004 UT 101 at 1J12 (second, third, and fourth
alterations in original) (quotations and citation omitted).
When petitioner asked the court for additional time to gather evidence
under Rule 31 from a witness who testified as to the malicious nature of the
actions of defendants abuse of process, the Judge refused to allow the taking of
evidence, see transcript p 16 lines 13 to page 17 line 15 and also page 18 line 17
to page 19 line 8. A subpoena under Rule 31 had already been issued, see Record
at 357-360. The Subpoena was issued on January 13th 2007, and the time to
respond had not passed prior to dismissal. The Judge did not quash or address the
subpoena.
The Judge clearly considered material outside of the pleadings in the
hearing, including proffers of evidence from counsel for Defendant. Petitioner
objected to the proffer of this evidence. See transcript at page 41 line 5-6 and 1824. By not taking Plaintiffs version of the facts at face value, and deciding on the
merits against Plaintiffs version of events, the Court improperly granted summary
disposition without notice to even allow refuting testimony, affidavits, and
arguments of law. For this reason the error should be reversed and the case
remanded.
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9.2 Did the court enter a Judgment on the pleadings when the pleadings when the
pleadings were not closed and now answer was filed?
The standard of review for this issue is quoted in Tuttle vs. Olds, 2007 UT App
10, at Tf6(quoted in full above) and f 7:
f 7 Plaintiffs claim that the trial court should be reversed for
treating Defendants' rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a rule
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P.
12(c). In its order granting the motion, the trial court
referred to the motion as one for a judgment on the pleadings,
despite a reminder from Defendants that their motion was one to
dismiss under 12(b)(6). Because Defendants never filed an answer
to the complaint, the pleadings were not closed at the time the
trial court granted the so-called judgment on the pleadings. A
motion for a judgment on the pleadings cannot be made, let alone
granted, prior to the closing of the pleadings. See id. (stating
that 12(c) motions are to be made after the pleadings have been
closed). We will therefore review the trial court's decision as
if it had correctly referred to the granted motion as one for
dismissal under rule 12(b)(6). 1
This issue was not preserved, as the court raised this issue for the first time
when it docketed it's Judgment as "05-29-07 Filed judgment: Judgment on
Pleading" As there was no opportunity to respond to an answer, or even advanced
notice that the judgment was "on the pleading" this issue should be reviewed at the
appellate level.
There is no dispute that an answer was not filed. See transcript page 45
lines 16-18. Yet a Judgment on the pleadings was entered. Even if the court of
Appeals can establish that the pleading of Petitioner should be dismissed under
Rule 12(b), the judgment of dismissal with prejudice is no longer justified. The
court specifically stated that the dismissal was with prejudice due to reviewing

material outside of the pleadings in it's final order. See Record at page 590 f4.
Even if the court of appeals finds that dismissal was proper under Rule 12(b) for
failure to state a claim, the award of attorneys fees can not stand due to it's
reliance upon material outside of the pleadings, and should be reversed. In
addition, Plaintiff should be allowed to file a motion for leave to amend.
9.3 Did the Court allow an affirmative defense of "proper purpose" and resjudicata to be raised in defense of the abuse of process claim on Rule 12(b)(6)
motion ?
The standard of review is found in Tucker V. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. 2002 UT 54 further quoting Gill v. Timm, which notes that
"affirmative defenses must be set forth in responsive pleadings and are usually
waived if not so pleaded." (citations omitted). 720 P.2d 1352, 1353-54 (Utah
1986):
7 Gill recites the general rule that affirmative defenses should be set
forth in responsive pleadings. Id.; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c).
Because dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is "justified only when the
allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate that the
plaintiff does not have a claim," 5 A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 345 (2d ed.
1990) (emphasis added),(2) this general rule recognizes that
affirmative defenses, which often raise issues outside of the
complaint, are not generally appropriately raised in a motion to
dismiss under rule 12(b)(6).
This issue was preserved for appeal at page 472 of the record, at f 6 in
Petitioner's Rule 52 and 59 motion and at trial page 57 line 25 through page 58
line 14. While the issue was only raised for the first time with citations to law in

the rule 52 and 59 motion, plaintiff did object to both the lack of answer (See
transcript page 45 lines 16-18.) and to allowing material outside the pleadings to
be entered in support of res-judicata (See transcript at page 41 line 5-6 and 18-24.)
and also in support of the hearsay nature of the "proper purpose" claims of
Defendants, advanced by way of an affidavit of Attorney Sivilstrini testifying to
the actions and mental state of Attorney Lundgren. See Record at 296.
In any event, the error is clear. Affirmative defenses of proper purpose and
res-judicata were raised without an answer. The res-judicata defense was raised at
the hearing, prior to announcement of conversion, without allowing response.
Because of this error the court of appeals should reverse and remand for further
proceedings including amendment of the form of the pleading if appropriate.
9.4 Should dismiss have been without prejudice based upon the pleadings?
The standard of review is quoted above in Turtle vs. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, at ^[6.
In a dismissal based upon Rule 12(b), which has not been converted on full and
fair notice to a Rule 56 motion, the dismissal should be without prejudice to other
claims, causes of action, or pleadings being raised by motion for leave to amend.
This issue was preserved at trial at Transcript page 46 lines 6-11. It is well settled
that in order to constitute res-judicata and a dismissal of a claim with prejudice, a
judgment must have been based upon a full and fair hearing, with adequate notice
and an opportunity to present evidence. To quote from Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006
UT App 168 at Tfl2, 'The issue of whether The issue of "whether res judicata bars
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an action presents a question of law[,] which we review for correctness." Massey
v. Board of Trs. of the Ogden Area Cmty. Action Comm., Inc., 2004 UT App
27,TJ5, 86 P.3d 120 (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted)." If
the present dismissal was based upon a full and fair hearing and opportunity to
present and rebut evidence, then the conclusion of the trial court was correct.
However as it was not based upon proper notice, and the copy of the order was
sprung upon the parties, the dismissal should have been without prejudice.
9.5 Was an award of attorney's fees appropriate given the court must make factual
inferences in favor of Plaintiff, not Defendant.
The standard of review is found in To quote Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT APP 36,
996 P.2d 1081 which states:
When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), an
appellate court must accept the material allegations of the complaint
as true, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it
clearly appears the complainant can prove no set of facts in support
of his or her claims. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841
P.2d 742, 744 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992). "A dismissal is a severe measure and should be
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of
its claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah
1990). Additionally, we "must consider all the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff."
Anderson, 841 P.2d at 744. "The propriety of a trial court's decision
to grant or deny a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) is a question
of law that we review for correctness." Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1253.
This issue was preserved on page 472 of the record, \1 in the Rule 52 and
59 motion ruled upon by the Court and at trial in transcript. See for instance
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transcript at page 41 line 5-6 and 18-24. The court ignored the proffers of Plaintiff
proffer of evidence found at transcript page 24 line 8-25, and Page 51 lines 4
through page 52 line 10. Nowhere does the court cite to any clear evidence why
the current case is filed in bad faith, citing instead the proffers of evidence by Mr.
Bums that an "inference" from irrelevant facts justified a finding of bad faith. See
Transcript at page 7 line 22. The only motive for filing the suit was protection of
exempt assets and property of others from harassment and abuse of process. Even
if such protection was not available, the good faith effort to secure such protection
should not be punished.
The only sworn evidence before the court about Petitioner's mental state
was found at Record pages 455-467, Plaintiffs "Affidavit in Opposition to Motion
for Sanctions" filed on January 29 2007. The court ignored any testimony found
in this document, and made no specific findings of fact as to why the testimony
was not credible. While the court has considerable discretion to judge the
credibility of witnesses and weight the facts in a motion to dismiss filed after
pleadings are closed, and upon proper notice under Rule 56, it is patently unfair to
impose the same latitude on a Rule 12(b) motion.
Even the argument that the present suit was unnecessary is false. At the
time the suit was filed, the suit WAS necessary. Only after filing the suit was the
relief requested in the present suit granted. See Record at page 302-304, order of
Judge Hanson attached as Exhibit A to the memorandum in opposition to the
motion to dismiss, only signed by opposing counsel approving as to form on
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December 22n 2006. There is no way that a hypothetical claim that the suit was
unnecessary can stand, as only a time machine could prove if the partial settlement
found at R. 302 paragraphs 1-4 would not have happened. Had not the threat of
the other lawsuit been present, Defendants could have continued to press the
claims that they released only after being served on December 6 2006. See
Record at pages 139, 149, and 159, proof of service before withdrawal of claims
found at R. 302.
Finally, the award of attorneys fees was fraudulent. Defendants double
billed for a motion to consolidate in another case which was denied. The issue
was raised before the court, and the court awarded fees in another case. This issue
alone should warrant reversal. See Record at 518-525.
The court should reverse and remand the issue of attorney's fees as no bad
faith was involved, and the purpose of protecting exempt property and property of
others from harassing executions and garnishments is a proper purpose.
9.6 Was Summary Judgment against Plaintiff under Rule 56 appropriate?
The standard of review for the granting of the motion to dismiss in this
case is given by Ellsworth v. Lowell 2006 UT 77 f 11-12:
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Tfl 1 While Lowell moved to dismiss Mr. Ellsworth's complaint
pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
when "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." Utah
R. Civ. P. 12(b) (2006). Because "affidavits or other evidence"
were presented to, and not excluded by, the district court, we
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review that court's decision as a summary judgment. DOIT, Inc.
v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 839 (Utah 1996).
f 12 "[A] challenge to a summary judgment presents for
review only conclusions of law because, by definition, cases
decided on summary judgment do not resolve factual disputes."
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991).
We review the district court's legal conclusions for correctness,
without according deference to the district court. Id.
In addition, the standard of review for motions to dismiss under Rule 56
requires that the facts be recited by the appellate court in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. See Johnson v. Hermes 2005 UT 82 at ^[2:
Tf2 When reviewing a rule 56(c) motion for summary
judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. See Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake
County, 2003 UT 28, ^ 4, 73 P.3d 362. Thus, in reviewing these
facts, we present them in a light most favorable to Appellant
Hermes, the commercial developer in this case.
This issue was preserved for appeal at transcript page 16 line 13-22, and page 472
of the record, *fl in the Rule 52 and 59 motion. In summary, the Court found
against Plaintiff in what can only be described as a judgment that his affidavits
lacked credibility and should be ignored. This is nowhere better illustrated than in
the exchange over the pleading that Defendants were given sufficient information
to know that the retirement accounts were exempt, in which the court argued with
the proffers and affidavits of Plaintiff contradicting him with regard to damages.
See transcript at pages 30 onward, the court constantly asked irrelevant question
and sought to interrupt and discredit the testimony of Plaintiff. See page 31 line
24 to page 32 line 5:
24 THE COURT: But how did they know that,

25 Sir, until they send the constable out to check
I and find out what you have and at least inventory
2it3 MR. BRYNER: The reported interviews4 THE COURT: And give you an opportunity
5 to claim them as exempt?
Plaintiff had just told the court how they knew that by reading from his
affidavit backed with admissible exhibits. See Record at pages 214-267,
specifically pages 215-216, ^[8-14 and exhibits C,D, and E. The court simply
didn't believe the testimony of Plaintiff, despite the fact that he must do so in a
motion to dismiss unless the evidence is completely without foundation or
inadmissible.
Had an attorney who actually issued the writs testified by way of affidavit
to good faith as an affirmative defense, it might have been admissible under Rule
56 after the close of pleadings, however as argued in section 9.3 above.
9.7 Can Utah's garnishment law allow garnishment of retirement assets under 29
U.S.C. 1144(a), for any purpose whatsoever?
The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201,
1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. CT. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999);
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial
code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518,
521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
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A question of legislative intent associated with statutory interpretation is a matter
of law, not of fact. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law. See Slisze
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d
276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting which statute governs defendant's
placement is question of law reviewed for correctness).
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1041, R. 1411-1414, and transcript page
23. However I don't even have to argue this. If any order establishing that it is
proper to garnish ERISA exempt retirement accounts is made by this Court, the
federal courts can invalidate the statute, even if I didn't brief the issue properly.
Much as with constitutionality, the duty of the Court is to interpret the law of Utah
in such a way as to avoid invalidation by federal court.
9.8 Should the court void and preempt Utah Law under federal law.
The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201,
1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. CT. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999);
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial
code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518,
521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
A question of legislative intent associated with statutory interpretation is a matter
of law, not of fact. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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Whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law. See Slisze
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d
276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting which statute governs defendant's
placement is question of law reviewed for correctness).
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1411-1414. Even if not preserved, a
determination by a Utah Court that state garnishment law may attach ERISA
exempt retirement accounts will lead to the preemption of the entire law by a
federal court. Much as with constitutionality, the duty of the Court is to interpret
the law of Utah in such a way as to avoid invalidation by federal court. I am just
repeating the argument in the summary, without proper briefing, as the rules of
appellate procedure are not relevant to the issue of law raised clearly under the
federal statute. Courts occasionally have a compelling duty to law over procedural
technicalities, and fact over form. This is one of them. Do the right thing.
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(10) Relief Sought
10.1 Petitioner asks that the Court of Appeals review the ruling of the trial court
for legal correctness, and determine if his ruling is the law in the state of Utah.
10.2 Petitioner asks that the Court of Appeals remand to correct the error of
admitting a ruling from another case, at the time of a rule 12(b) hearing, without
notice of conversion to the parties, as well as the
10.3 Petitioner asks that the cour
10.4 Petitioner asks that the Court of Appeals declare that Utah's garnishment law
is void and preempted by 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), and to remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
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(11) Section 11, record sections index
A) Complaint, Record pages 1-9.
B) Affidavit in Support of Complaint (less exhibits) record pages 214-226.
C) Minute entry, findings of fact, and Order, record pages 582-595
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Signature and certificate of service
Dated this 18th day of January, 2008

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th

I certify that on the 18 day of January, 2007,1 did cause to be delivered by U.S.
Mail postage prepaid and by hand delivery the forgoing document to the following
persons:
Attorneys for Defendants and Appeallees
Cohne, Rappaport and Segal
257 E 200 S, Suite 700
Box 11008
SLC, UT 84147-0008
By Fax 801-364-3002
By Email emirv(a),crslaw.com
Original +7 copies
Mail
Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
PO 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
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FILED
DISTRICT C0UR1

06 DEC-7 AMIh 29
n'CST JORDAN DEPT.

Roger Bryner
Petitioner Pro Se
1042 East Ft. Union Blvd #330
Midvale, Utah 84047
Fax: 877-519-3413 Phone: 255-7729
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROGER BRYNER
Plaintiff,

Defendant.

)
;I

COMPLAINT

i

Case No.

)

Judge

Obo¥l7Sf1

Ad/HcUs

]

Plaintiff complains and alleges as follows:
General Allegations
1) Plaintiff is an individual, resides at 1037 watercress lane #2X, City of Midvale,
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.
2) Defendant #1 is Emily Smoak, Residing at 186 M St, Salt Lake City UT 84103
and doing business at 257 E 200 S, Suite 700, SLC, UT.
3) Defendant #2 is Howard Lundgren, Residing at 1357 Yale Ave, Salt Lake City
UT 84105 and doing business at 257 E 200 S, Suite 700, SLC, UT.
4) Defendant #3 is Cohne Rappaport and Segal, a professional corporation with
offices at 257 E 200 S, Suite 700, SLC, UT and a registered agent of Jeffrey L Silvestrini
at the same address.
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5) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion for attorney's fees in Case #
050922650. As a result of a 1 hour hearing and the two documents being filed, the case
was dismissed by Judge Hanson.
6) Defendants obtained a Judgment for attorney's fees in case # 050922650 on
October 26th 2006 for $17,292.00. This is not a case involving any child support and
only Defendants and Plaintiff are participants in the lawsuit.
7) Plaintiff offered to post a bond for the full amount of the Judgment including 3
years interest from a loan obtained from his retirement funds in a motion to stay and set
bond pending appeal filed on November 3 rd 2006.
8) Due to disclosures filed in case #044904183 which is a divorce action,
Defendants knew that Plaintiffs accounts at Fidelity Investments accounts below were
exempt retirement accounts.
a. ROLLOVER IRA, Fidelity Brokerage #129345466.
b. PROFIT SHARING KEOGH, Fidelity Brokerage #129404276
c. TRADITIONAL IRA, Fidelity Brokerage: #129409308
9) On December 1st 2006 Defendants obtained a garnishment against the exempt
retirement accounts in 8) at Fidelity Investments.
10) The action in 9) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful
1 l)The action in 9) was taken to harass.
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12)The action in 9) was taken with malice.
13)The action in 9) was taken to abuse process.
14)On December 1st 2006 Defendants filed "Application for Writ of Execution" in
the same case. The application filed with the Court listed only "Safe and contents
therein, including gold coins" however the writ of execution added the following text:
"2. Any and all other non-exempt personal property including but not limited to:
televisions, VCR9 s, couches, tables, chairs, dining room sets, jewelry, art work, cameras,
video recorders, watches, clocks, guns, skis, golf clubs, sporting goods, computers
(including all hardware & software), printers, and any and all other ...."
15)Defendants knew that couches, tables, chairs and dining room sets less than
$500 in value were exempt from execution.
16)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff has
nothing but old furniture with negligible value which is exempt from execution.
17)Defendants included exempt living room and kitchen property in the writ of
execution.
18) The action in 17) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful
19)The action in 17) was taken to harass.
20)The action in 17) was taken with malice.
21)The action in 17) was taken to abuse process.
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22)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff was
a computer professional who works from his home.
23)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff was
in possession of a large number of computers and software owned by his company,
Xilinx Inc (Stock symbol XLNX).
24)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff also
was in possession of exempt tools of the trade relating to the electronic engineering
profession.
25)Those tools owned by Plaintiff are subject to a $3500 exemption.
26)Defendants included property of Xilinx Corporation in the writ of execution.
27) The action in 26) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful
28)The action in 26) was taken to harass.
29)The action in 26) was taken with malice.
30)The action in 26) was taken to abuse process.
3 l)Defendants included exempt property of Plaintiff in the writ of execution.
32)The action in 31) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful
33)The action in 31) was taken to harass.
34)The action in 31) was taken with malice.
35)The action in 31) was taken to abuse process.
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36)The keepers receipt issued by Constable SD Warnick went even further than
this description, specifying all property seen without any exceptions for clothing, medical
equipment, provisions, or any of the other property allowed by law.
First Cause of Action. UCA 78-23-13 Injunctive relief, damages, or both allowed against
creditor to prevent violation of chapter - Costs and attorney's fees.
3 7) Accusations in 9)-36) are repeated as if contained in this section.
38)UCA 78-23-13 reads:
An individual or the spouse or a dependent of the individual is entitled to
injunctive relief, damages, or both, against a creditor or other person to
prevent or redress a violation of this chapter. A court may award costs and
reasonable attorney's fees to a party entitled to injunctive relief or damages.
3 9) Allowing Defendants to seize the trade tools and electrical engineering
equipment of Plaintiff which is worth less than $3500 owned by Xilinx Corporation
would result in irreparable harm including the loss of access to data by Xilinx, loss of
work time and the ability to work by Plaintiff, and harm to Plaintiffs relationship with
Xilinx.
40) Allowing Defendants to seize the exempt trade tools of Plaintiff would result in
irreparable harm including the loss of access to data by Xilinx, loss of work time and the
ability to work by Plaintiff, and harm to Plaintiffs relationship with Xilinx.
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41) Allowing Defendants to seize the exempt furniture or clothing including that
belonging to the Children would result in irreparable harm to Plaintiff who is going
through a custody evaluation at this time.
42) Allowing Defendants to seize the property of the Children would result in
irreparable harm to Plaintiff who is going through a custody evaluation at this time. The
property of the Children is the Joint Property of Svetlana Bryner and Roger Bryner, who
share Joint custody of the children.
43)Plaintiff asks that this Court enter a temporary injunction restraining
Defendants from removing any exempt property, or from seeking a writ of execution in
another case against the same exempt property.
Second Cause of Action, Abuse of Process.
44) Actions in 9)-36) are repeated as if included in this section.
45)Defendants have a duty to not include exempt property in any writ of
execution.
46)Defendants by taking actions in 9)-36) above have breached their duty.
47)The actions taken in 9)-36) are the malicious and deliberate misuse or
perversion of regularly issued court process not justified by the underlying legal action.
48)Plaintiff has been harmed by such action, including but not limited to harm
from disclosure of the writs to my employer (Xilinx), the legal actions which Plaintiff has
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been forced to take in this and other actions to defend against the unlawful process, and
attorney's fees in this action.
Wherefore Plaintiff respectfully asks that this Court:
1) Immediately enter a temporary restraining order preventing the removal of any
exempt property listed in "affidavit of exempt property and value"
2) Declare any order knowingly specifying exempt property void.
3) That the Defendants reimburse Xilinx Corporation and Plaintiff for any and all
fees and damages for any result of Defendant's actions.
4) That Defendants pay all costs including court costs and service costs associated
with bringing this complaint, and Petitioner be allowed to retain an attorney for any
further action.
Dated this /

day of December, 2006

^ 7

,

y&oger Brynen^
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Open Sealed Record

$155 Q
$205 Q
$75 •

D Check if child support, custody or
visitation wiD be part of decree

$ 15 5
$ 15 5
$155
$40
$ 15 5

•
D
•
D
D

%2Sj •

Gestational Agreement
Grandparent Visitation
Paternity
Modify Divorce Decree
Separate Maintenance
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act (UCCJA)

•
•

$155
$155
$155 Q
$155
$155
$155
$155 D
$155 D
$155
$155 D
$155

a
a
a

a

$0
$25
$0
$0
$0

a
a
a
p

a
Q

$0
$25

a
a

$0
$25

a
a

$25

a

$25

•
a

$155

Wrongful Lien
Effective QS/01/06

Exhibit B

Roger Bryner
Petitioner Pro Se
1042 East Ft. Union Blvd #330
Midvale, Utah 84047
Fax: 877-519-3413 Phone: 255-7729

^'^'ORIGINAL

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROGER BRYNER
Plaintiff,
vs.
Cohne Rappaport and Segal
Howard Lundgren
Emily Smoak

)
)

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
COMPLAINT

)

Case No. 060417519

)

Judge Adkins

Defendant.
Plaintiff having been sworn an oath to tell the truth, and to not testify based upon my
belief but only upon those fact which I have personal knowledge of testified to the
following facts which are numbered to correspond to the accusations set forth in the
complaint served upon defendants. Petitioner testifies:
General Allegations
1) Plaintiff is your affiant and resides at 1037 watercress lane #2X, City of
Midvale, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.
2) Defendant #1 is Emily Smoak, Residing at 186 M St, Salt Lake City UT 84103
and doing business at 257 E 200 S, Suite 700, SLC, UT.
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3) Defendant #2 is Howard Lundgren, possibly Residing at 1357 Yale Ave, Salt
Lake City UT 84105 and doing business at 257 E 200 S, Suite 700, SLC, UT.
4) Defendant #3 is Cohne Rappaport and Segal, a professional corporation with
offices at 257 E 200 S, Suite 700, SLC, UT and a registered agent of Jeffrey L Silvestrini
at the same address.
5) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion for attorney's fees in Case #
050922650. As a result of a 1 hour hearing and the two documents being filed, the case
was dismissed by Judge Hanson.
6) Defendants obtained a Judgment for attorney's fees in case # 050922650 on
October 26th 2006 for $17,292.00. This is not a case involving any child support and
only Defendants and Plaintiff are participants in the lawsuit.
7) Plaintiff offered to post a bond for the full amount of the Judgment including 3
years interest from a loan obtained from his retirement funds in a motion to stay and set
bond pending appeal filed on November 3 rd 2006. The Court approved a cash bond or a
corporate surety. See Exhibit A, order on Plaintiffs Motion to Stay Judgment.
8) Due to disclosures filed in case #044904183 which is a divorce action,
Defendants knew that Plaintiffs accounts at Fidelity Investments accounts below were
exempt retirement accounts. Defendants knew the specific account numbers of the
accounts at fidelity . See Exhibit B, application for writ of garnishment. Defendants only
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knew the accounts numbers because they were disclosed as retirement accounts in
"Petitioners Response To Respondents First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests For
Admissions, And Requests For Production Of Documents" pages 36-39, attached as
Exhibit C. These two facts, that the account numbers were specified by Defendants and
that the only data Defendants had which did so also specified them as retirement
accounts, clearly shows that the action could only be taken with the knowledge that it was
not allowed.
a. ROLLOVER IRA, Fidelity Brokerage #129345466.
b. PROFIT SHARING KEOGH, Fidelity Brokerage #129404276
c. TRADITIONAL IRA, Fidelity Brokerage: #129409308
9) On December 1st 2006 Defendants obtained a garnishment against the exempt
retirement accounts in 8) at Fidelity Investments. See Exhibit D, writ of garnishment.
10)The action in 9) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful. It is
common knowledge even among non-lawyers that retirement accounts are exempt from
execution.
1 l)The action in 9) was taken to harass. Emily Smoak and Howard Lundgren
have lied about me again and again in Court. They have brought the same claims as
many as 9 times in a row in multiple cases, and have had filing restrictions imposed
against them in cases # 060903365 and #044904183. See Exhibit E, order stating "Court
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has been overwhelmed in this case—and in the companion paternity/divorce case, Docket
No. 044904183—by the sheer volume of pleadings, many of which, as the Court has
already found, are frivolous. Accordingly, the Court agrees that the time has come to put
some limitations on the filings. The Court enjoins each side from filing more than one
motion at a time." The evidence of the prior orders of the Court in two cases imposing
filing restrictions upon an attorney is clear evidence of their bad faith. While a nonattorney such as myself might simply be ignorant of the law, there is no such defense for
CRS to have filing restrictions imposed against them. They should have been disbarred.
12)The action in 9) was taken with malice. David W. Brown has talked to them
and has told me that they have extreme malice and fear for me.
13)The action in 9) was taken to abuse process. See Exhibit I, "12-29-06 Filed
order: Order on execution of plaintiffs property, Judge thanson, Signed December 29,
2006" which establishes that the writ of execution was not valid and specified exempt
property.
14)On December 1st 2006 Defendants filed "Application for Writ of Execution" in
the same case. The application filed with the Court listed only "Safe and contents
therein, including gold coins" however the writ of execution added the following text:
"2. Any and all other non-exempt personal property including but not limited to:
televisions, VCR' s, couches, tables, chairs, dining room sets, jewelry, art work, cameras,
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video recorders, watches, clocks, guns, skis, golf clubs, sporting goods, computers
(including all hardware & software), printers, and any and all other ...."
15)Defendants knew that couches, tables, chairs and dining room sets less than
$500 in value were exempt from execution. This is common knowledge for attorney's.
16)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff has
nothing but old furniture with negligible value which is exempt from execution. See
Exhibit F, financial disclosure of Petitioner in case #044904183 served upon Defendants
on November 24th 2006. Also, there was an earlier dispute about the division of minor
property in case #044904183 which established the minor value of the property involved.
See "Petitioners Response To Respondents First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests For
Admissions, And Requests For Production Of Documents"
17)Defendants included exempt living room and kitchen property in the writ of
execution. See Exhibit G, writ of execution including keepers receipt.
18)The action in 17) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful. It is
common knowledge that $500 exemptions for living room furniture and kitchen furniture
exist.
19)The action in 17) was taken to harass. See ^[11 above.
20)The action in 17) was taken with malice. See ^12 above.
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21)The action in 17) was taken to abuse process. See Exhibit I, "12-29-06 Filed
order: Order on execution of plaintiffs property, Judge thanson, Signed December 29,
2006" which establishes that the writ of execution was not valid and specified exempt
property.
22)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff was
a computer professional who works from his home. See "Affidavit Of Greg Brown
Served Upon Defendants In Case #044904183 In Aug 2004"filedconcurrently with this
motion. This was also included in "Petitioners Response To Respondents First Set Of
Interrogatories, Requests For Admissions, And Requests For Production Of Documents"
and many pleadings in case #044904183.
23)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff was
in possession of a large number of computers and software owned by his company,
Xilinx Inc (Stock symbol XLNX). See ^[22 above.
24)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff also
was in possession of exempt tools of the trade relating to the electronic engineering
profession. See Tf22 above.
25)Those tools owned by Plaintiff are subject to a $3500 exemption.
26)Defendants included property of Xilinx Corporation in the writ of execution.
This was done in secret, and hidden from the Judge. In addition, no statement attesting to
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the fact that they did not believe that anyone else owned the equipment was included as
CRS normally does. See Exhibit H, application for writ of execution in case #
004902839 not involving Plaintiff in which Howard Lundgren's document stated the
standard language "2. That the personal property sought to be garnished, upon
information and belief, is non-exempt. 3. That upon information and belief, such real
property sought to be garnished does not consist in whole or part of earnings from
personal services as defined in Rule 64D(d)(vi) U.R.C.P." in order to get the writ. This is
noticeably missing from both the application for writ of garnishment and also the
application for writ of execution. See Exhibits D and G and "Affidavit Of Jeffrey L.
Silvestrini In Support Of Writ Of Execution In Case # 050922650" filed concurrently
with this affidavit.
27)The action in 26) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful. It is
common knowledge that you can not seize the property of another.
28)The action in 26) was taken to harass. See f l 1 above.
29)The action in 26) was taken with malice. See |12 above.
30)The action in 26) was taken to abuse process. See Exhibit I, "12-29-06 Filed
order: Order on execution of plaintiffs property, Judge thanson, Signed December 29,
2006" which establishes that the writ of execution was not valid and specified exempt
property.
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3 9) Allowing Defendants to seize the trade tools and electrical engineering
equipment of Plaintiff which is worth less than $3500 owned by Xilinx Corporation
would result in irreparable harm including the loss of access to data by Xilinx, loss of
work time and the ability to work by Plaintiff, and harm to Plaintiffs relationship with
Xilinx. See "AFFIDAVIT OF GREG BROWN IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA IN
CASE # 050922650" filed concurrently with this affidavit.
40) Allowing Defendants to seize the exempt trade tools of Plaintiff would result in
irreparable harm including the loss of access to data by Xilinx, loss of work time and the
ability to work by Plaintiff, and harm to Plaintiffs relationship with Xilinx. See
"AFFIDAVIT OF GREG BROWN IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA IN CASE #
050922650" filed concurrently with this affidavit.
41)Allowing Defendants to seize the exempt furniture or clothing including that
belonging to the Children would result in irreparable harm to Plaintiff who is going
through a custody evaluation at this time. The attempt to take everything in the living
room and kitchen, just prior to the children arriving, can only be harassment.
42) Allowing Defendants to seize the property of the Children would result in
irreparable harm to Plaintiff who is going through a custody evaluation at this time. The
property of the Children is the Joint Property of Svetlana Bryner and Roger Bryner, who
share Joint custody of the children.
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the fact that they did not believe that anyone else owned the equipment was included as
CRS normally does. See Exhibit H, application for writ of execution in case #
004902839 not involving Plaintiff in which Howard Lundgren's document stated the
standard language "2. That the personal property sought to be garnished, upon
information and belief, is non-exempt. 3. That upon information and belief, such real
property sought to be garnished does not consist in whole or part of earnings from
personal services as defined in Rule 64D(d)(vi) U.R.C.P." in order to get the writ. This is
noticeably missing from both the application for writ of garnishment and also the
application for writ of execution. See Exhibits D and G and "Affidavit Of Jeffrey L.
Silvestrini In Support Of Writ Of Execution In Case # 050922650" filed concurrently
with this affidavit.
27)The action in 26) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful. It is
common knowledge that you can not seize the property of another.
28)The action in 26) was taken to harass. See 1J11 above.
29)The action in 26) was taken with malice. See TJ12 above.
30)The action in 26) was taken to abuse process. See Exhibit I, "12-29-06 Filed
order: Order on execution of plaintiffs property, Judge thanson, Signed December 29,
2006" which establishes that the writ of execution was not valid and specified exempt
property.
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31 )Defendants included exempt property of Plaintiff in the writ of execution.
32)The action in 31) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful. It is
common knowledge that a $3500 exemption for trade tools exists.
33)The action in 31) was taken to harass. See ^[11 above.
34)The action in 31) was taken with malice. See % 12 above.
35)The action in 31) was taken to abuse process. See Exhibit I, "12-29-06 Filed
order: Order on execution of plaintiffs property, Judge thanson, Signed December 29,
2006" which establishes that the writ of execution was not valid and specified exempt
property.
36)The keepers receipt issued by Constable SD Warnick went even further than
this description, specifying all property seen without any exceptions for clothing, medical
equipment, provisions, or any of the other property allowed by law. See Exhibit G,
keepers receipt.
First Cause of Action, UCA 78-23-13 Injunctive relief damages, or both allowed against
creditor to prevent violation of chapter -- Costs and attorney's fees.
37) Accusations in 9)-36) are repeated as if contained in this section.
38)UCA 78-23-13 reads:
An individual or the spouse or a dependent of the individual is entitled to
injunctive relief, damages, or both, against a creditor or other person to
prevent or redress a violation of this chapter. A court may award costs and
reasonable attorney's fees to a party entitled to injunctive relief or damages.

3 9) Allowing Defendants to seize the trade tools and electrical engineering
equipment of Plaintiff which is worth less than $3500 owned by Xilinx Corporation
would result in irreparable harm including the loss of access to data by Xilinx, loss of
work time and the ability to work by Plaintiff, and harm to Plaintiffs relationship with
Xilinx. See "AFFIDAVIT OF GREG BROWN IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA IN
CASE # 050922650" filed concurrently with this affidavit.
40) Allowing Defendants to seize the exempt trade tools of Plaintiff would result in
irreparable harm including the loss of access to data by Xilinx, loss of work time and the
ability to work by Plaintiff, and harm to Plaintiffs relationship with Xilinx. See
"AFFIDAVIT OF GREG BROWN IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA IN CASE #
050922650" filed concurrently with this affidavit.
41)AUowing Defendants to seize the exempt furniture or clothing including that
belonging to the Children would result in irreparable harm to Plaintiff who is going
through a custody evaluation at this time. The attempt to take everything in the living
room and kitchen, just prior to the children arriving, can only be harassment.
42) Allowing Defendants to seize the property of the Children would result in
irreparable harm to Plaintiff who is going through a custody evaluation at this time. The
property of the Children is the Joint Property of Svetlana Bryner and Roger Bryner, who
share Joint custody of the children.
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43)Plaintiff asks that this Court enter a temporary injunction restraining
Defendants from removing any exempt property, or from seeking a writ of execution in
another case against the same exempt property. This is done in good faith as CRS also
opposes me in the civil case 044904183, the protective order in case 064905584, and the
stalking injunction in case 060903365. There is no reason to go through the same
exercise in all these cases.
Second Cause of Action, Abuse of Process.
44) Actions in 9)-36) are repeated as if included in this section.
45)Defendants have a duty to not include exempt property in any writ of
execution. I believe that the basis of abuse of process is the duty to use court process
only for that purpose which it was intended, that is to take non-exempt property. Clearly
CRS also believes they have a duty and has in prior cases in good faith affirmed that duty
by exhibit H where they did in the past.
46)Defendants by taking actions in 9)-36) above have breached their duty.
47)The actions taken in 9)-36) are the malicious and deliberate misuse or
perversion of regularly issued court process not justified by the underlying legal action.
Clearly if they knew the property was exempt, they knew that it would be a perversion to
seek it anyway.
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48)Plaintiff has been harmed by such action, including but not limited to harm
from disclosure of the writs to my employer (Xilinx), the legal actions which Plaintiff has
been forced to take in this and other actions to defend against the unlawful process, and
attorney's fees in this action. While I have not received a bill from David W. Brown, I
retained him to represent me in the hearing before Judge Hanson. These fees were only
as a result of the actions of CRS's refusal to stipulate to the relief that was only granted at
the hearing, after 1 hour of wasted time. CRS did not prevail on ANY of it's claims, and
each and every item sought to be exempted was declared exempt. Furthermore I
expended no less than 4 hours myself, and 12 or more emails with the Xilinx legal
department in this effort. Also, Xilinx had to hire a local attorney, Richard Flint, to
represent them in this case. Also my car could not be removed from December 1st 2006
to December 28 2006, resulting in the necessity of renting a car from Avis for 4 weeks
at $160/week. Finally, more attorney's fees will be required in this case to defend against
their illegal and abusive action, and their frivolous defenses. There are damages.

Subscribed and Sworn this 2nd day of January, 2007

Court Clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 2nd day of January, 2007,1 did cause to be delivered by hand the forgoing
document to the following persons:
Attorney's for Defendants
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C.
257 E 200 S, Suite 700
SLC, UT 84147-0008
By Fax 801-364-3002
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Exhibit C

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

ROGER BRYNER,

vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

.

:Case No. 060417519

EMILY SMOAK,& COHNE
RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.,

The first matter before the Court is Plaintiff's Objection
to Draft Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated February
28, 2007. Plaintiff raises numerous objections to the content of
the Findings and Conclusions and an objection that the Findings and
Conclusions were never served and "therefore this is not before the
Court."
The proposed Findings and Conclusions and the proposed Order
that were filed with the Court on February 23, 2007, each contain
a Certificate of Service certifying that both documents were mailed
to Plaintiff on February 15, 2007. On February 23, 2007, Plaintiff
filed Verified Motion to Allow Normal Time to File Objection to
Draft Order and Findings and Avoid a Rust To Judgment. Plaintiff's
Verified Motion stated that he had received the Findings of Fact
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and Conclusions of Law "with a mailing certificate dated February
15, 2007." Plaintiff's copy of the mailing certificate was not
signed. However, Plaintiff attached to the Verified Motion a letter
dated February 15, 2007, addressed to him from the attorney for
defendants, Thomas J. Burns, as well as the envelope postmarked
02/15/07 in which the documents were mailed. It is clear to the
Court that the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order were mailed to the Plaintiff and are properly before the
Court.
The Court has considered each of Plaintiff's objections to the
specific paragraphs of the Findings and Conclusions and Order and
finds that each is without merit and each objection is denied. The
Court has signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order contemporaneously with signing this Memorandum Decision.
The next matter is the request for an award of attorney's fees
pursuant to Section 78-27-56 U.C.A. Following the hearing of
February 2, 2007, the Court determined that this case was without
merit and was not brought in good faith. The Court gave defendants
ten days to submit an Affidavit seeking an award of attorney's fees
pursuant

to

Section

78-27-56, and Defendants

have

done so.

Plaintiff has filed a Verified Objection to Affidavit of Thomas J.
Burns and an Affidavit of Impecuniosity. [The Court on February 16,
2007, denied Plaintiff's request to waive court fees, because the
Court did not and does not find that the Plaintiff is impecunious.]
Plaintiff's

Verified

Objection

makes

the

claim

that

"as

Defendants only prevailed on the merits of their motion to dismiss,
it is not just or proper to give them attorney's fees for anything
other

than

their

motion

to

dismiss."

Plaintiff

claims

that

Defendant's did not prevail on their opposition to the Verified
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, or on their Motion to
Strike the Affidavit of David W. Brown or on Defendants' Motion to
Consolidate. Defendants had to respond to the Verified Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order. Plaintiff did not obtain a TRO, and
this action was dismissed in total. Defendants had to respond to
the Affidavit

of

David

W.

Brown. While

the

Court

did not

specifically rule on the Motion To Strike The Affidavit, the Court
dismissed the action in total. Defendants filed the Motion To
Consolidate which was heard by Judge Toomey after the Court granted
the Motion To Dismiss in this case. Judge Toomey did not grant the
Motion to Consolidate, because this action was by then ordered
dismissed. Defendants were forced to respond to the Motion for TRO
and the Affidavit of David W. Brown because Plaintiff brought this
action, which the Court has found to be meritless. Further,
Defendants properly moved to consolidate both actions, before this
Court

ruled

on

the

Motion

To

Dismiss. Defendants

prevailed

completely in this action by getting this case dismissed.
Plaintiff questions the amount of time claimed by Defendants'
attorneys. The Court notes that although this case was filed on
December 7, 2 006, the Court's file is now two full files. The Court
has read every pleading in this case. The Court does not doubt that
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Defendants' attorneys have expended

the time claimed

in the

Affidavit of Thomas J. Burns. The Court finds that the time
expended by Defendants' attorneys was reasonable and necessary to
defend against Plaintiff's action. The Court finds that the hourly
rate charged by the attorneys and the paralegal are reasonable.
Defendants are awarded attorneys' fees in the sum of $12,563.75.
Defendants' attorney is to prepare the Judgment for attorneys'
fees in accordance herewith.
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JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI #2959
THOMAS J. BURNS (BAR # 8918)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
257 East 200 South, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Facsimile: (801) 355-1813
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROGER BRYNER,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vs.EMILY SMOAK, A. HOWARD
LUNDGREN, and COHNE, RAPPAPORT
& SEGAL, P.C,

Case No. 060417519
Judge Robert Adkins

Defendants.
This matter came before this court regularly for a decision on Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint and for an Award of Attorney Fees pursuant to Utah's Bad Faith
statue, Utah Code section 78-27-56 (2004). Defendants submitted their Motion to Dismiss,
accompanied by supporting affidavits and other material, and Plaintiff responded by also filing
affidavits and other material. The matter came on for hearing on February 2,207. Plaintiff
represented himself at the hearing and Defendants were represented by Jeffrey L, Silvestrini and
Thomas J. Burns. Because materials outside the pleadings were submitted by both parties, the
Court deems it appropriate to treat Defendants' motion as one for Summary Judgment pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 of the Utah R. Civ. P. Having considered the papers of the parties
and having heard argument and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters its Findings of
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Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In December 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint against certain of the Defendants, which
resulted in a judgment being entered against Plaintiff for bad faith filing pursuant to Utah
Code section 78-27-26 (2004) in late 2006.

2.

Plaintiff did not satisfy the judgment entered against him in case number 050922650.

3.

In an effort to obtain at least partial satisfaction of the judgment in case number
050922650, Defendants obtained a Writ of Execution and two Writs of Garnishment in
that action.

4.

Plaintiffs complaint, filed in this case, focused on these writs.

5.

Attached to Defendants Writ of Execution were a notice of exemption and a request for
hearing.

6.

Plaintiff was provided with an opportunity to request, and did request, a hearing on the
writ from the trial court in case number 050922650, and the trial court entertained his
claims that certain property was exempt from execution.

7.

The judgment issued in case number 050922650 was never stayed or otherwise
suspended; thus, Defendants were entitled to seek satisfaction of their judgment through
the use of Writs of Execution and Garnishment.

8.

As permitted by rule, Plaintiff challenged Defendants right to execute on certain property
in case number 050922650, and after Defendants declared that they had no interest in the
majority of Plaintiff s property, the trial court ruled on Plaintiffs objection and clearly
identified the non-exempt property upon which Defendants could execute.
2
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9.

Following the hearing, Defendants executed only on the identified non-exempt property.

10.

The filing of this current action was unnecessary to protect Plaintiffs interests and
property; all protections available to Plaintiff could have been, and were, afforded to him
in case number 050922650. In that case, Judge Hanson specifically identified the nonexempt property on which Defendants could execute, and he specifically limited the
scope of Defendants' execution.

11.

The trial court in case number 050922650 was positioned to provide Plaintiff with any
additional protections, up to and including injunctive relief; however, it granted Plaintiff
no such relief.

12.

On the day before hefiledthe complaint in this case, Plaintiff transmitted an electronic
mailing to the Defendants, notifying them that he intended to file this separate lawsuit and
indicating that he was doing so, at least in part, to avoid contact with Judge Hanson,
whose decisions had dissatisfied him in the past. Plaintiffs message concerning Judge
Hanson was derogatory in nature.

13.

To support an abuse of process claim, Plaintiff must present some evidence that
Defendants obtained their Writs for some purpose other than that for which the writs are
intended. It is clear to this court that Defendants obtained their Writs for the proper
purpose of satisfying their existing, unsatisfied judgment against Plaintiff.

14.

Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim for abuse of process in that Plaintiff has failed
to plead any improper damages resulting from Defendants resort to Writs of Execution
and Writs of Garnishment. Further, Plaintiff was provided due process on this issue in
case number 050922650, where the court provided Plaintiff with a hearing and an
3
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opportunity to request any and all relief It is clear from the record that Defendants never
took actual possession of, and never attempted to sell, any of Plaintiff s exempt property,
either before or after Plaintiff identified property as exempt.
15.

Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is equally without merit. Access to injunctive relief
requires Plaintiff to show that he has no other speedy remedy available to him to seek the
relief he seeks through the injunction. Plaintiff was provided with, and availed himself
of, another speedy remedy concerning Defendants' Writs, i.e., Plaintiff was provided with
a hearing by the trial court in case number 050922650 and permitted to seek redress at
that hearing.

16.

The court understands that the nature of the this case is the result of emotion and that
Plaintiff is angry with the Defendants, at least in part due to Defendant Smoak's ongoing
representation of Plaintiff s former domestic partner.

17.

Plaintiffs complaint lacks merit as a whole, and Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient
facts to support any of the claims that may be included in his complaint.

18.

Further, the court finds that Plaintiff filed his complaint in bad faith, in part to harass and
delay Defendants, and in part to avoid any further involvement with Judge Hanson.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Plaintiffs complaint is meritless, in that the trial court in case number 050922650 could,
and did, provide him with all of the relief available to him under the circumstances, and
this court cannot provide him with any additional relief.

2.

Plaintiff filed his complaint in bad faith in that he filed the complaint to harass
Defendants, to force Defendants to expend unnecessary time and resources in connection
4

with their efforts to collect their judgment, and to delay Defendants efforts to collect on
their lawfully issued judgment.
3.

This court elects to grant Defendants' requests for an award of fees pursuant to Utah code
section 78-26-57, and directs Defendants to submit an Affidavit of the Accrued fees
within ten days of this hearing. Plaintiff will be provided ten days to respond to the
affidavit, and Defendant will then be given an opportunity to reply. This court will delay
ruling on the amount to be awarded, if any, until this matter is submitted for decision
through the normal course of events.

4.

Given that this court has reviewed matters beyond the pleading, this court elects to treat
Defendants' Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment, and this court grants said
Motion, which results in Plaintiffs complaint being dismissed, with prejudice.

DATED this ~7 day of

/flaxck

, 2007.
BY

Approved as to form and content:
Roger Bryner
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JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI #2959
THOMAS J. BURNS (BAR # 8918)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
257 East 200 South, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Facsimile: (801) 355-1813
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

ROGER BRYNER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

-vs.EMILY SMOAK, A. HOWARD
LUNDGREN, and COHNE, RAPPAPORT
& SEGAL, P.C,

Case No. 060417519
Judge Robert Adkins

Defendants.
Based upon the findings and conclusions announced by this court, and issued
contemporaneously with this order, this court enters the following Order:
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, but because this court has considered materials
beyond the pleadings, this court treats the Motion as one of Summary Judgment, resulting
in the dismissal of Plaintiff s complaint with prejudice;

2.

Plaintiffs complaint was without merit and brought in bad faith;

3.

Defendants' request for an award of attorney fees based on Plaintiffs bad faith filing is
granted. Defendants shall submit their affidavit of costs and fees, if any, within ten days
of this court's oral decision, entered February 2,2007.

4.

All other motions and matters pending in this case are rendered moot as a result of this
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decision.
DATED this

"7

fllmk

/

day of Fefe**a*y 2007.

BY THE

Approved as to form and content:
Roger Bryner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the 7th day of March, 2007,1 delivered a true and correct copy of the forgoing
Memorandum Decision, to the following
Plaintiff, pro se
Roger Bryner
1042 East Ft. Union Blvd, #330
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorney for Defendants
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini
257 East 200 South, Suite 700
PO Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

Court Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /S" day of February, 2007 I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be served via first
class mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Roger Bryner
1042 East Ft. Union Blvd. #330
Midvale, UT 84047
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the / ^ day of February, 2007,1 caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER to be served via first class mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Roger Bryner
1042 East Ft. Union Blvd. #330
Midvale, UT 84047
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